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Abstract: We propose that one of the main causes of shortcomings in European labour 
markets is the existence of corporate cartels, through which the state has delegated 
various forms of regulatory power to employers and employees that act as cartels. 
Analysis indicates that these cartel arrangements are not in the interest of labour 
because they are hard to combine with the demands of a modern and knowledge-based 
economy. Hence, a modernization of European labour market models is needed.
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Resumen: Proponemos que una de las principales causas de las deficiencias que 
presentan los mercados de trabajo europeos es la existencia de cárteles corporativos, 
a través de los cuales el estado ha delegado varias maneras de regular el poder para 
empleados y empleadores que actúan como cárteles. El análisis indica que estos cárteles 
no actúan en interés del empleo ya que son difíciles de encajar con las demandas de 
una economía moderna basada en el conocimiento. Por tanto, una modernización de 
los modelos de mercado de trabajo Europeos se hace necesaria.
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1. Introduction
European labour market models are at a crossroads. In many European countries, 
job creation, productivity and growth have lagged behind the goals set by leading 
politicians and policy makers in Europe and they have now fallen behind the 
economic achievements of the United States and many other parts of the world. 
Almost all Western European countries have experienced an overall lack of 
employment, but the problem is most serious for specific groups such as the 
young, immigrants and the disabled. When combined with challenges caused by 
an ageing population, the problem of unemployment will have severe effects on 
welfare, particularly on public welfare systems in the long term.
The developing unemployment problem is underscored by fundamental 
changes in how the world’s economy works, resulting in economic restructuring 
of both companies and countries. In our view, labour market institutions, 
including systems of wage formation, play a key role in determining Europe’s 
ability to meet these challenges. A modern, competitive, and knowledge-based 
economy also needs modern laws and regulations for its labour markets.
In this paper, we propose that one of the main causes of the current 
shortcomings in European labour markets is the existence of what we shall call 
corporate cartels. We define this term as corporate arrangements by which the 
state has directly or indirectly delegated various forms of regulatory power to 
certain organizations of employers and employees, which act as cartels with the 
goal of affecting labour demand and supply.
In Scandinavia and continental Europe, forms of these corporate cartels 
have existed for at least the past hundred years. Forms of corporate cartels differ 
considerably across countries and European labour market models. 
2. European labour market models
Several labour market scholars have argued that there are three different 
European labour market models (Sapir, 2005; Boeri, 2002). In fact, although 
each European country has its own specific traits, at least four different labour 
market models can be distinguished in Europe (Karlson and Lindberg 2008): 
the Continental, Latin, Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon models. Some, such as 
Esping-Andersen (1999), would also argue that different welfare state regimes 
and models of industrial relations are interconnected and clustered together with 
numerous institutional path dependencies, concerning labour market regulations, 
systems of social insurance and management of unemployment, among others.
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These models have evolved over time and are characterized by a number of 
elements governing the organization of industrial relations and wage-setting 
systems and the regulation of employment conditions such as employment 
protection. 
The first group of countries belongs to the Continental model, which is 
the dominant model for explaining labour market relationships in continental 
Europe. This model has also strongly influenced the European Union’s legislation 
on labour market issues. In this model, the state plays a large role, and legislation 
is the most prominent regulatory instrument. However, bargaining between the 
parties and collective agreements are still important features. Thus, a distinctive 
feature of the Continental model is tripartism, meaning that social partners and 
the state govern industrial relations together.
The Continental model’s emphasis on regulation is based on a view that 
labour differs fundamentally from other commodities. This view has descended 
from Romano-Germanic legal systems and also puts forth a moral basis on which 
the relationship between employer and employee should rest. Legislation is thus 
predominantly aimed at protecting employees from market forces (Hepple and 
Veneziani, 2009). 
By law, collective agreements are binding for the bargaining parties (unions 
and employers organizations) and can be enforced as such. The system often 
includes extension mechanisms, whereby collective agreements can be extended 
to non-members of both bargaining party sides by government decree. Through 
this mechanism, the level of coverage of collective agreements is very high. 
Countries with this model also have high levels of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) and co-determination. These rights are predominantly based 
on the rights of the individual employee, which are enforced legally by public 
authorities or work councils, but not by unions. 
In terms of flexicurity, this group of countries has a high level of industrial 
regulation, including strict rules for job protection and the provision of generous 
unemployment benefits The need to improve labour market flexibility is often 
emphasized in this labour market model.
The second model is the Latin or South European model, which is also based 
on Romano-Germanic legal systems and emphasizes that labour is different from 
a normal commodity. As in the Continental model, the state plays an important 
role, perhaps even more so due to the fact that the bargaining parties have less 
coverage and are more divided. In these countries, commonplace features of 
relations between bargaining include high levels of industrial conflict and highly 
politicized, internally divided labour unions. Bargaining agreement coverage 
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is upheld by employers’ associations as well as legal extensions of collective 
agreements to non-union workers and firms (Karamessini, 2007). 
Labour market policies in these counties are distinguished by rigid EPLs 
and frequent efforts to reduce unemployment through early retirement policies. 
In part due to rigid EPLs, but also due to partial deregulation of EPLs covering 
temporary employees, labour market segmentation develops between protected 
workers (often male, prime age and older) and less-protected labour force 
participants (young and predominantly female). The former have comparative job 
stability and experience relatively low unemployment rates, while the latter have 
high unemployment rates and face employment instability (Skedinger, 2009).
These countries are farthest from the flexicurity model because their labour 
markets generally have low levels of flexibility, and social protection mechanisms 
are not as strong as employment protection provisions. These welfare systems 
are not aimed at labour force participation for all workers, but instead emphasize 
early retirement and non-participation for women.
The third model is the Nordic or Scandinavian model, which provides a high 
degree of self-regulation for bargaining parties. The role of the state is more 
limited; traditionally, bargaining parties have been given the right to make their 
own rules for governing the labour market. Hence, legislation provides only a 
framework for regulations and rules arbitrated by collective agreements. However, 
since the 1970s, there have been exceptions to this pattern. Collective agreements 
are now legally binding for organizations and their members. Employers are also 
legally obligated to apply the provisions of collective bargaining agreements to 
non-member employees. 
In this model, unions and employers’ associations play an important role by 
signing and upholding collective agreements. Moreover, unions protect their 
employees’ rights to co-determination and employment protection. Therefore, 
this model relies on a high level of participatory membership in both unions 
and employers’ associations. To achieve the anticipated level of coverage for their 
collective agreements, labour unions have been given extraordinary rights of 
conflict through blockades of unorganized or unofficial firms, as well as firms 
that do not employ union members. In some countries, this model also provides 
relatively strong legal regulations for insiders on the labour market through a rigid 
EPL. Combined with high minimum wages stipulated by collective bargaining 
agreements, this EPL generates a segmented labour market, with widespread 
unemployment within the young and immigrant labour force pools (Skedinger, 
2009).
15RIO, Nº 9, 2012
Corporate cartels and challenges to European labour market models
In this model, flexicurity is based on an active labour market policy, strong 
mechanisms of safety and security in public welfare systems and flexibility within 
collective agreements that are easily adjustable based on different industries’ 
dividing needs. According to some researchers, flexicurity in the Nordic countries 
represents a level of benchmark flexicurity when contrasted with the other three 
models (Hinst, 2011; Sapir et al, 2003).
The fourth model is the Anglo-Saxon model, which presents a more market-
based view of the labour market. This model is based on a classical liberal 
philosophy of small government and employs less comprehensive welfare 
policies than those in northern and continental Europe. There are low levels of 
labour force coverage under collective agreements, just as there are low levels 
of membership in unions and employers’ organizations. Moreover, this model 
is founded on common law rather than legislation, and the notion of a flexible 
labour market ruled by price mechanisms, along with a small amount of 
regulation. Greater freedom is provided to individual employers to hire and fire 
personnel, to set pay and define terms of employment and to determine working 
conditions, which allows for higher business efficiency and higher productivity. 
In addition, greater flexibility avoids the problem identified in the other three 
models, in which permanent pools of unemployed workers are unable to enter 
the labour market because existing regulations protect the current labour force 
participants. Overall, this model differs significantly from the three other models 
in several important respects. 
This model has more flexibility than security, particularly with respect to 
Continental and Southern European countries. The difference in flexibility 
presented between this model and these countries is striking. Because bargaining 
has been more strongly de-collectivised, this model presents greater opportunities 
for flexibility in wages and work conditions. According to Eamets et al (2009), 
the liberal Anglo-Saxon labour market model comes close to flexicurity, although 
it provides lower compensation rates for unemployment.
3. Corporate cartels in European labour markets
Despite differences in their form and specific details, the first three European 
labour market models (the Continental, Latin, and Scandinavian) share a 
number of features.
First, over time, the bargaining parties have been given legislative functions. 
The state has directly or indirectly delegated various forms of regulatory power 
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to certain organizations of employers and employees. To facilitate the delegation 
of these powers, the state has established forms of legal support for collective 
organization and collective bargaining. In this way, collective bargaining has 
become the main method of determining employment conditions ( Jacobs, 
2009). In particular, these corporate arrangements contain a formal extension 
mechanism for collective agreements, which exists only in the Continental and 
Latin models. In the Scandinavian model, a similarly high level of coverage is 
achieved instead through union oversight of the extension.
Second, in these labour market models, the bargaining parties (unions and the 
employers’ associations) act openly as cartels, with ambitions to affect the supply 
and demand of labour and, thereby, the wage levels within the labour market. 
As shown above, these cartels are supported by various forms of legislation and 
institutions such as special labour courts, in which representatives from these 
organizations act as judges. In general, employers’ and workers’ organizations have 
developed symbiotic methods of close mutual collaboration in exercising these 
functions. In many cases, these cartels also have the right to administer some 
portions of the country’s social security system. In the Scandinavian countries 
(and Belgium), labour unions administer heavily subsidized unemployment 
insurance through an arrangement known as the Ghent system (Karlson and 
Lindberg, 2008; Scruggs, 2001).
As mentioned above, the Anglo-Saxon model differs dramatically from the 
other three models. Most importantly, this model does not include corporate 
cartels. Generally, the labour market is not viewed differently from any other 
market. 
4. Labour interest and the corporate cartels
In our opinion, the existence of these corporate cartels, which we shall call cartels, 
is one of the main causes of shortcomings in the European labour markets. It is 
challenging to combine the existence of corporate arrangements through which 
the state has directly or indirectly delegated various forms of regulatory power to 
certain organizations of employers and employees, which act as cartels with the 
goal of affecting the supply and demand of labour, with the demands of a modern, 
competitive, and knowledge-based economy, where incentives, flexibility and 
decentralisation often serve as prerequisites to job creation, business dynamics 
and welfare. 
The legitimacy of these corporate cartels is often based on the notion that 
labour is not a commodity, meaning that its value should not be determined solely 
17RIO, Nº 9, 2012
Corporate cartels and challenges to European labour market models
by market exchange. However, legal cartels also often benefit existing industries, 
restricting entry, entrepreneurship and competition, which restricts industrial 
restructuring and job creation. In fact, at least in certain cases, employers rather 
than unions have been the main advocates for these kinds of labour market 
arrangements (Swenson, 2002). Moreover, they benefited insiders in the labour 
market, at the expense of outsiders, such as young people and immigrants. The 
consequence of this distribution of benefits had high social costs. This can occur 
when corporate cartels are combined with a strong EPL.
The tables below show the relationship between coverage and membership in 
labour unions and employers’ organizations.
Table 1
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Table 1 
	  
Source: Visser, J. (2011) ICTWSS-database. Data for 2008 are used.	  
	  
	  
Source: Visser, J. (2011) ICTWSS-database. Data for 2008 are used.
It should be noted that in many Continental and Latin countries, coverage of 
collective agreements is very high, despite low or very low levels of labour union 
membership. As shown above, this indicates the use of various forms of extension 
mechanisms. Only in the Scandinavian countries does union membership remain 
relatively high. 
In contrast, almost entirely the opposite relationship holds when we study 
membership in employers’ organizations.
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Source: Visser, J. (2011) ICTWSS-database. Data for 2008 are used. 	  
	  
	  
Source: Visser, J. (2011) ICTWSS-database. Data for 2008 are used. 
In general, the level of organization of employers’ associations is much higher 
than the level of organization of employees in labour unions. In particular, in 
many of the Continental and Latin countries, where labour union membership 
levels are low or very low, the employers’ associations are very well organized. 
In the tables below, changes in union coverage are shown for several countries.
Table 3
Source: Visser, J. (2011) ICTWSS-database. Data for 2008 are used for this plot. 
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Table 4
Country 2008 2004 Change
Austria 28.9 34.4 -5.5
Belgium 51.9 53.1 -1.2
Czech Republic 20.2 22.3 -2.1
Denmark 67.6 71.7 -4.1
Estonia 7.3
Finland 67.5 73.3 -5.8
France 7.7 7.8 -0.1
Germany 19.1 22.2 -3.1
Greece 24 24.5 -0.5
Hungary 16.8 16.9 -0.1
Iceland 94.3
Ireland 32.3 35.9 -3.6
Italy 33.4 34.1 -0.7
Japan 18.2 19.3 -1.1
Latvia 14.8 21 -6.2
Lithuania 8.5 14 -5.5
Luxembourg 37.4 42.3 -4.9
Netherlands 18.9 21.3 -2.4
Norway 53.3 55 -1.7
Poland 15.6 19.7 -4.1
Portugal 20.4 21.4 -1
Slovak Republic 16.8 23.6 -6.8
Slovenia 29.7 40.3 -10.6
Spain 14.3 15.5 -1.2
Sweden 68.3 78.1 -9.8
Switzerland 18.3 19.6 -1.3
United Kingdom 27.1 29.4 -2.3
United States 11.9 12 -0.1
Source: Visser, J. (2011) ICTWSS-database. Data for 2008 are used for this plot. 
As shown above, union coverage is decreasing in almost all countries, but 
perhaps most in the Scandinavian countries This may indicate that corporate 
cartels are not in the best interest of labour.
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5. The causes of change
Today, all four European labour market models are under strong pressure to 
change. In particular, this is true for the models that are based on various forms 
of corporate cartels. Many common forces are driving this development. Unions 
have been weakened both by declining membership and by their decreasing role 
in facilitating collective bargaining. Collective bargaining coverage has eroded, 
while more regulatory rights and legal powers have been transferred to firms. 
Where collective bargaining exists, it takes place at a more decentralized level, 
closer to the firm or workplace (Karlson and Lindberg, 2011). 
First and foremost, globalisation has placed increasing importance on 
multinational enterprises, international trade and capital flow, and global 
competition in an increasing number of sectors, and it has generated a shift 
towards globally integrated production systems. Because many enterprises 
have the option to move production or investment abroad, this restricts both 
policymakers and bargaining parties, including each side’s decision to undertake 
industrial action. 
We have also seen that hierarchically structured enterprises are able to 
transform into more flexibly organized entities. Fordist organizations have been 
replaced with so-called integrated production systems. This means that a far-
reaching, horizontal division of labour and principles of specialization for certain 
production process operations have been replaced with more decentralized 
work organizations and autonomous teams with job rotation, among others. 
As a consequence, more decentralized decision-making within workplaces may 
increase job satisfaction and efficiency. 
Moreover, there has been a major shift towards a service-based economy. 
The long-term transition in the economy, from industrial production to service 
production, seems to have occurred at the same time as globalization. Among 
other things, this means that the proportion of employees who have completed 
higher education has risen considerably, whereas the share of traditional 
blue-collar workers has declined. In addition, in the service-based economy, 
investments in workers’ competence and knowledge may be just as important as 
investments in physical capital.
A final fundamental factor affecting labour market conditions is the de-
collectivization of industrial relations across Europe and the industrialized world. 
In most OECD countries, levels of unionization reached a peak around 1980, 
but have decreased substantially since then. In France, unionization decreased 
from 19 to 8 percent between 1980 and 2008; in Great Britain, unionization 
decreased from 54 to 29 percent; and in the US, unionization decreased from 
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23 to 12 percent. According to the Visser database (2009) on union density, the 
unweighted average unionization rate has declined by 0.35 percent each year 
between 1974 and 2007. The slowest decline has been in the Nordic countries, 
where the process of de-collectivization started later; however, it is nevertheless 
visible (Bacarro and Howell, 2010).
This trend is partly explained by structural changes in the economy. The 
growth of smaller businesses and enterprises in the service sector has shifted 
the economy towards jobs that have traditionally been harder for unions to 
penetrate. Moreover, the existence of typical full-time, permanent jobs is also 
shrinking. Permanent jobs are being steadily replaced by non-standard contracts 
such as part-time jobs, fixed-term contracts or temporary workers. Crumbling 
organization membership also has an effect of individualism; collective solutions 
in general have declined since the 1980s.
The de-collectivization of industrial relations can also be seen as an effect 
of increasing human capital, which generated new requirements for greater 
employee competence in industrial and service production sectors. New 
techniques and organizational ideas shifted focus from employee collectives to 
the individual employee. Standardized solutions for working conditions and 
wages were therefore replaced with differentiated solutions and contracts. 
The figures for industrial action show a similar pattern. Between 1974 and 
2007, there was a strong declining trend in the number of strikes and number of 
working days lost in European countries. The natural interpretation of this trend 
is that union strength was weakening, as indicated by Bacarro and Howell (2010). 
In some countries, such as Great Britain, this decline was caused by reforms that 
outlawed some forms of industrial action. However, these legislative changes did 
not occur throughout Europe. The decline may have been an effect of globalization 
and increasing competition, as the few strikes and lockouts that did occur appear 
to take place in more sheltered industries, according to Lindberg (2007).
6. At the crossroads: four scenarios
These challenges are common to all European labour market models. Institutional 
change is indeed taking place in most countries. However, we believe the models 
characterized by corporate cartels may have to change the most if the problems 
of unemployment, job creation and growth are to be successfully managed. 
However, this does not imply that these four labour market models, or the 
corresponding national systems of industrial relations, are necessarily converging 
in their institutional forms (Wailes, Bamber and Lansbury, 2010). Instead, 
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different institutional forms have been reshaped to fit the common imperative of 
liberalization (Bacarro and Howell, 2010). 
Ever since the convergence thesis was formulated by Kerr et al (1960), on 
the grounds that «the logic of industrialism» would make systems of industrial 
relations alike across many countries, there is a critique that path dependencies, 
institutional complementarities, and national features would resist these drivers 
of change. 
It is no exaggeration to say that scholars of industrial relations have been 
hostile to the notion of convergence, and a predominant portion of this field has 
instead held the view of enduring diversity, including a range of mostly distinct 
national systems (Streeck, 2009). Within this perspective, an influential school of 
thought in comparative employment relations research is the so-called Varieties 
of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Thelen, 2009).
Other scholars, for example Ohmae (1995), claimed that globalization and 
other factors, which will be described later in this chapter, would create a common 
pressure across all countries to introduce similar systems of industrial relations 
outcomes. This line of thought has been described as the «simple globalization 
approach.» The argument by Streeck and Thelen (2005) that increasing 
competition via globalization may exert pressure on existing institutions to 
change incrementally is somewhat more popular.
In other words, it is not as easy as saying that European labour market models 
are moving in the direction of the Anglo-Saxon model. There is no determinism 
involved, and the models still differ. Both legislators and the social partners 
themselves have several policy options available. 
In the following paragraphs, we will briefly present four different scenarios 
for the future of European labour markets, depending on which path is chosen 
at this crossroads (Karlson and Lindberg 2008). Hopefully, these scenarios may 
serve as frameworks for future discussion.
Disruption
Disruptiom, the first scenario, involves developments that may occur if nothing is 
changed. In this case, there is a risk that several of the European labour markets 
models will be disrupted and break apart. The causes discussed above show that 
the Latin, Continental and Scandinavian models are not stable, at least not in the 
long run. Increasing globalization and competition contribute to this scenario by 
making capital less tied to its country of origin. When union participation rates 
continue to diminish, cartels may therefore not be able to uphold their functions 
any longer. In order to stay competitive, coordinated wage bargaining will be hard 
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to maintain, as the corporate cartels continue to lose membership and legitimacy. 
However, the need for substantial reform may be blocked by vested interests that 
seek to protect their power and resources through legislation and support from 
influential groups. The recent case of public and state employees blocking reforms 
in Southern Europe, most notably in Spain, Portugal and Greece, during the 
2010–2011 European sovereign debt crisis, is an example of this phenomenon. 
Re-regulation
The second scenario, re-regulation, is the ongoing process of harmonising rules and 
regulations concerning labour markets and social agendas within the European 
Union. This is an attempt to protect workers from possible exploitation with 
the help of legislation. In the Nordic or Anglo-Saxon countries, this legislation 
is less frequent at the national level, which means that this scenario will increase 
regulations for many countries. This implies increasing regulation at the EU-level 
and indicates an implicit agenda of harmonisation of labour laws throughout the 
EU. On the one hand, as the EU is actively promoting the concept and agenda 
of flexicurity, this could contribute to more labour market flexibility and security 
for employees against labour market risks (Pedersini, 2008). On the other hand, 
both the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries may enforce more direct state 
regulation of labour markets, which may not be in the interest of labour. 
De-regulation
Another possible path for the European counties would be to follow the 
direction of the Anglo-Saxon model’s market-based view of the labour market. 
As corporate cartels have lost influence as a result of membership decline and 
globalization, many economists have argued for a more de-regulated labour 
market. In this outcome, corporate cartels on both sides will lose influence 
because their privileged position was formerly based on corporate arrangements. 
These bargaining parties had been given legislative functions to control low-wage 
competition or to prevent workers from being exploited.
In this scenario, labour market institutions would be restructured in an Anglo-
Saxon fashion by reducing the level and duration of unemployment benefits, by 
lowering employment protection, and by de-collectivizing wage bargaining, with 
the goal of making wages more adaptable to the free market (Nickell, 1997). The 
de-collectivization and decreasing role of collective bargaining is already apparent 
in many parts of Europe and is a possible outcome of current economic trends. 
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Modernization
Finally, there is a fourth possible way of modernising the European labour 
market models. This alternative builds on a common understanding of the 
challenges confronting the labour market and addresses these challenges by 
reforming collective agreements and their supporting legislation, which would 
require involvement from both the bargaining parties and governments. This 
modernisation may take different forms in different parts of Europe, as each 
labour market model to some degree faces different challenges. 
The goals of most legislation that codifies collective bargaining, such as 
strike rules, employment protection, and employment participation, were 
established in a time of vastly different production conditions. Modernisation 
must therefore reflect the reality that the erosion of bargaining coverage and the 
transfer of regulatory power to firms is largely due to a new business logic of 
enterprises. Collective bargaining takes place at a more decentralised level, closer 
to the firm or workplace, because organizations and workplaces have changed 
fundamentally over the past few decades. Knowledge-based enterprises and 
employees need more flexicurity in labour market dynamics, but this does not 
have to occur outside collective bargaining arrangements, if they are able to adapt 
to the service-based economy. 
In conclusion, we believe this modernization of European labour market 
models may be a prerequisite to job creation, productivity and growth.
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